File _service:tar_scm_kernel_repo:CVE-2020-1472.patch of Package samba

From 73e6fca6101be935a72f1bfbe15ddfd9fd30d105 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2020 16:04:57 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 01/19] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): libcli/auth: add
 netlogon_creds_random_challenge()

It's good to have just a single isolated function that will generate
random challenges, in future we can add some logic in order to
avoid weak values, which are likely to be rejected by a server.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14497

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
---
 libcli/auth/credentials.c | 7 +++++++
 libcli/auth/proto.h       | 3 +++
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+)

diff --git a/libcli/auth/credentials.c b/libcli/auth/credentials.c
index 319dacdac0b..c79f5e2ce24 100644
--- a/libcli/auth/credentials.c
+++ b/libcli/auth/credentials.c
@@ -30,9 +30,16 @@
 #include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
 #include <gnutls/crypto.h>
 
+void netlogon_creds_random_challenge(struct netr_Credential *challenge)
+{
+	ZERO_STRUCTP(challenge);
+	generate_random_buffer(challenge->data, sizeof(challenge->data));
+}
+
 static void netlogon_creds_step_crypt(struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *creds,
 				      const struct netr_Credential *in,
 				      struct netr_Credential *out)
+
 {
 	if (creds->negotiate_flags & NETLOGON_NEG_SUPPORTS_AES) {
 		AES_KEY key;
diff --git a/libcli/auth/proto.h b/libcli/auth/proto.h
index afd7f0d148d..19a0e846357 100644
--- a/libcli/auth/proto.h
+++ b/libcli/auth/proto.h
@@ -11,10 +11,13 @@
 
 /* The following definitions come from /home/jeremy/src/samba/git/master/source3/../source4/../libcli/auth/credentials.c  */
 
+void netlogon_creds_random_challenge(struct netr_Credential *challenge);
+
 void netlogon_creds_des_encrypt_LMKey(struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *creds, struct netr_LMSessionKey *key);
 void netlogon_creds_des_decrypt_LMKey(struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *creds, struct netr_LMSessionKey *key);
 void netlogon_creds_des_encrypt(struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *creds, struct samr_Password *pass);
 void netlogon_creds_des_decrypt(struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *creds, struct samr_Password *pass);
+
 NTSTATUS netlogon_creds_arcfour_crypt(struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *creds,
 				      uint8_t *data,
 				      size_t len);
-- 
2.20.1

From 1c6ac6d3502160e068858795670c9e56d4972f40 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2020 16:07:30 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 02/19] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): s4:torture/rpc: make use of
 netlogon_creds_random_challenge()

This will avoid getting flakey tests once our server starts to
reject weak challenges.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14497

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
---
 source4/torture/rpc/lsa.c      |  2 +-
 source4/torture/rpc/netlogon.c | 34 ++++++++++++----------------------
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

diff --git a/source4/torture/rpc/lsa.c b/source4/torture/rpc/lsa.c
index 0ce113feb5d..52370f4fe8e 100644
--- a/source4/torture/rpc/lsa.c
+++ b/source4/torture/rpc/lsa.c
@@ -2872,7 +2872,7 @@ static bool check_pw_with_ServerAuthenticate3(struct dcerpc_pipe *p,
 	r.in.credentials = &credentials1;
 	r.out.return_credentials = &credentials2;
 
-	generate_random_buffer(credentials1.data, sizeof(credentials1.data));
+	netlogon_creds_random_challenge(&credentials1);
 
 	torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, dcerpc_netr_ServerReqChallenge_r(b, tctx, &r),
 		"ServerReqChallenge failed");
diff --git a/source4/torture/rpc/netlogon.c b/source4/torture/rpc/netlogon.c
index 94fe4020fa9..f966ff6865b 100644
--- a/source4/torture/rpc/netlogon.c
+++ b/source4/torture/rpc/netlogon.c
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ bool test_SetupCredentials(struct dcerpc_pipe *p, struct torture_context *tctx,
 	r.in.credentials = &credentials1;
 	r.out.return_credentials = &credentials2;
 
-	generate_random_buffer(credentials1.data, sizeof(credentials1.data));
+	netlogon_creds_random_challenge(&credentials1);
 
 	torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, dcerpc_netr_ServerReqChallenge_r(b, tctx, &r),
 		"ServerReqChallenge failed");
@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ bool test_SetupCredentials2ex(struct dcerpc_pipe *p, struct torture_context *tct
 	r.in.credentials = &credentials1;
 	r.out.return_credentials = &credentials2;
 
-	generate_random_buffer(credentials1.data, sizeof(credentials1.data));
+	netlogon_creds_random_challenge(&credentials1);
 
 	torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, dcerpc_netr_ServerReqChallenge_r(b, tctx, &r),
 		"ServerReqChallenge failed");
@@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ bool test_SetupCredentials3(struct dcerpc_pipe *p, struct torture_context *tctx,
 	r.in.credentials = &credentials1;
 	r.out.return_credentials = &credentials2;
 
-	generate_random_buffer(credentials1.data, sizeof(credentials1.data));
+	netlogon_creds_random_challenge(&credentials1);
 
 	torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, dcerpc_netr_ServerReqChallenge_r(b, tctx, &r),
 		"ServerReqChallenge failed");
@@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ bool test_SetupCredentialsDowngrade(struct torture_context *tctx,
 	r.in.credentials = &credentials1;
 	r.out.return_credentials = &credentials2;
 
-	generate_random_buffer(credentials1.data, sizeof(credentials1.data));
+	netlogon_creds_random_challenge(&credentials1);
 
 	torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, dcerpc_netr_ServerReqChallenge_r(b, tctx, &r),
 		"ServerReqChallenge failed");
@@ -1283,7 +1283,7 @@ static bool test_ServerReqChallengeGlobal(struct torture_context *tctx,
 	r.in.credentials = &credentials1;
 	r.out.return_credentials = &credentials2;
 
-	generate_random_buffer(credentials1.data, sizeof(credentials1.data));
+	netlogon_creds_random_challenge(&credentials1);
 
 	torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, dcerpc_netr_ServerReqChallenge_r(b1, tctx, &r),
 		"ServerReqChallenge failed on b1");
@@ -1372,7 +1372,7 @@ static bool test_ServerReqChallengeReuseGlobal(struct torture_context *tctx,
 	r.in.credentials = &credentials1;
 	r.out.return_credentials = &credentials2;
 
-	generate_random_buffer(credentials1.data, sizeof(credentials1.data));
+	netlogon_creds_random_challenge(&credentials1);
 
 	torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, dcerpc_netr_ServerReqChallenge_r(b1, tctx, &r),
 		"ServerReqChallenge failed on b1");
@@ -1461,7 +1461,7 @@ static bool test_ServerReqChallengeReuseGlobal2(struct torture_context *tctx,
 	r.in.credentials = &credentials1;
 	r.out.return_credentials = &credentials2;
 
-	generate_random_buffer(credentials1.data, sizeof(credentials1.data));
+	netlogon_creds_random_challenge(&credentials1);
 
 	torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, dcerpc_netr_ServerReqChallenge_r(b1, tctx, &r),
 		"ServerReqChallenge failed on b1");
@@ -1551,7 +1551,7 @@ static bool test_ServerReqChallengeReuseGlobal3(struct torture_context *tctx,
 	r.in.credentials = &credentials1;
 	r.out.return_credentials = &credentials2;
 
-	generate_random_buffer(credentials1.data, sizeof(credentials1.data));
+	netlogon_creds_random_challenge(&credentials1);
 
 	torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, dcerpc_netr_ServerReqChallenge_r(b1, tctx, &r),
 		"ServerReqChallenge failed on b1");
@@ -1643,8 +1643,7 @@ static bool test_ServerReqChallengeReuseGlobal4(struct torture_context *tctx,
 	r.in.credentials = &credentials1_random;
 	r.out.return_credentials = &credentials_discard;
 
-	generate_random_buffer(credentials1_random.data,
-			       sizeof(credentials1_random.data));
+	netlogon_creds_random_challenge(&credentials1_random);
 
 	torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, dcerpc_netr_ServerReqChallenge_r(b1, tctx, &r),
 		"ServerReqChallenge failed on b1");
@@ -1656,7 +1655,7 @@ static bool test_ServerReqChallengeReuseGlobal4(struct torture_context *tctx,
 	r.in.credentials = &credentials1;
 	r.out.return_credentials = &credentials2;
 
-	generate_random_buffer(credentials1.data, sizeof(credentials1.data));
+	netlogon_creds_random_challenge(&credentials1);
 
 	torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, dcerpc_netr_ServerReqChallenge_r(b1, tctx, &r),
 		"ServerReqChallenge failed on b1");
@@ -1667,16 +1666,7 @@ static bool test_ServerReqChallengeReuseGlobal4(struct torture_context *tctx,
 	r.in.credentials = &credentials1_random;
 	r.out.return_credentials = &credentials_discard;
 
-	generate_random_buffer(credentials1_random.data,
-			       sizeof(credentials1_random.data));
-
-	r.in.server_name = NULL;
-	r.in.computer_name = "CHALTEST3";
-	r.in.credentials = &credentials1_random;
-	r.out.return_credentials = &credentials_discard;
-
-	generate_random_buffer(credentials1_random.data,
-			       sizeof(credentials1_random.data));
+	netlogon_creds_random_challenge(&credentials1_random);
 
 	torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, dcerpc_netr_ServerReqChallenge_r(b1, tctx, &r),
 		"ServerReqChallenge failed on b1");
@@ -1752,7 +1742,7 @@ static bool test_ServerReqChallengeReuse(struct torture_context *tctx,
 	r.in.credentials = &credentials1;
 	r.out.return_credentials = &credentials2;
 
-	generate_random_buffer(credentials1.data, sizeof(credentials1.data));
+	netlogon_creds_random_challenge(&credentials1);
 
 	torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, dcerpc_netr_ServerReqChallenge_r(b, tctx, &r),
 		"ServerReqChallenge");
-- 
2.20.1

From fad146f00af94f9df9494b50973ca44210114916 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2020 16:08:38 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 03/19] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): libcli/auth: make use of
 netlogon_creds_random_challenge() in netlogon_creds_cli.c

This will avoid getting rejected by the server if we generate
a weak challenge.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14497

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
---
 libcli/auth/netlogon_creds_cli.c | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/libcli/auth/netlogon_creds_cli.c b/libcli/auth/netlogon_creds_cli.c
index 50a5f50a57d..0b31dc91b4b 100644
--- a/libcli/auth/netlogon_creds_cli.c
+++ b/libcli/auth/netlogon_creds_cli.c
@@ -1177,8 +1177,7 @@ static void netlogon_creds_cli_auth_challenge_start(struct tevent_req *req)
 
 	TALLOC_FREE(state->creds);
 
-	generate_random_buffer(state->client_challenge.data,
-			       sizeof(state->client_challenge.data));
+	netlogon_creds_random_challenge(&state->client_challenge);
 
 	subreq = dcerpc_netr_ServerReqChallenge_send(state, state->ev,
 						state->binding_handle,
-- 
2.20.1

From dc22be580eb063c6c6bec460aeac13fb483a0284 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2020 16:10:53 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 04/19] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): s3:rpc_server:netlogon: make
 use of netlogon_creds_random_challenge()

This is not strictly needed, but makes things more clear.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14497

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
---
 source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c b/source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c
index c9aaa90cbb9..3894eecd7ae 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c
@@ -839,8 +839,7 @@ NTSTATUS _netr_ServerReqChallenge(struct pipes_struct *p,
 
 	pipe_state->client_challenge = *r->in.credentials;
 
-	generate_random_buffer(pipe_state->server_challenge.data,
-			       sizeof(pipe_state->server_challenge.data));
+	netlogon_creds_random_challenge(&pipe_state->server_challenge);
 
 	*r->out.return_credentials = pipe_state->server_challenge;
 
-- 
2.20.1

From c5ea97101f3e96a216010295e2e92e4c6bd0c508 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2020 16:10:53 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 05/19] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): s4:rpc_server:netlogon: make
 use of netlogon_creds_random_challenge()

This is not strictly needed, but makes things more clear.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14497

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
---
 source4/rpc_server/netlogon/dcerpc_netlogon.c | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/source4/rpc_server/netlogon/dcerpc_netlogon.c b/source4/rpc_server/netlogon/dcerpc_netlogon.c
index ac745e32b02..bb97e86055a 100644
--- a/source4/rpc_server/netlogon/dcerpc_netlogon.c
+++ b/source4/rpc_server/netlogon/dcerpc_netlogon.c
@@ -90,8 +90,7 @@ static NTSTATUS dcesrv_netr_ServerReqChallenge(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_cal
 
 	pipe_state->client_challenge = *r->in.credentials;
 
-	generate_random_buffer(pipe_state->server_challenge.data,
-			       sizeof(pipe_state->server_challenge.data));
+	netlogon_creds_random_challenge(&pipe_state->server_challenge);
 
 	*r->out.return_credentials = pipe_state->server_challenge;
 
-- 
2.20.1

From 47976c98c56fae72761ebd3832f903aafe58c8e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2020 16:15:26 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 06/19] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): libcli/auth: add
 netlogon_creds_is_random_challenge() to avoid weak values

This is the check Windows is using, so we won't generate challenges,
which are rejected by Windows DCs (and future Samba DCs).

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14497

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
---
 libcli/auth/credentials.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
 libcli/auth/proto.h       |  1 +
 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/libcli/auth/credentials.c b/libcli/auth/credentials.c
index c79f5e2ce24..dce0a9151e9 100644
--- a/libcli/auth/credentials.c
+++ b/libcli/auth/credentials.c
@@ -30,10 +30,31 @@
 #include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
 #include <gnutls/crypto.h>
 
+bool netlogon_creds_is_random_challenge(const struct netr_Credential *challenge)
+{
+	/*
+	 * If none of the first 5 bytes of the client challenge is unique, the
+	 * server MUST fail session-key negotiation without further processing
+	 * of the following steps.
+	 */
+
+	if (challenge->data[1] == challenge->data[0] &&
+	    challenge->data[2] == challenge->data[0] &&
+	    challenge->data[3] == challenge->data[0] &&
+	    challenge->data[4] == challenge->data[0])
+	{
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	return true;
+}
+
 void netlogon_creds_random_challenge(struct netr_Credential *challenge)
 {
 	ZERO_STRUCTP(challenge);
-	generate_random_buffer(challenge->data, sizeof(challenge->data));
+	while (!netlogon_creds_is_random_challenge(challenge)) {
+		generate_random_buffer(challenge->data, sizeof(challenge->data));
+	}
 }
 
 static void netlogon_creds_step_crypt(struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *creds,
diff --git a/libcli/auth/proto.h b/libcli/auth/proto.h
index 19a0e846357..51d5deaab2d 100644
--- a/libcli/auth/proto.h
+++ b/libcli/auth/proto.h
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 
 /* The following definitions come from /home/jeremy/src/samba/git/master/source3/../source4/../libcli/auth/credentials.c  */
 
+bool netlogon_creds_is_random_challenge(const struct netr_Credential *challenge);
 void netlogon_creds_random_challenge(struct netr_Credential *challenge);
 
 void netlogon_creds_des_encrypt_LMKey(struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *creds, struct netr_LMSessionKey *key);
-- 
2.20.1

From a4b33f5d6416ce1869d9d491cb272c69994e7d6b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2020 16:17:29 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 07/19] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): libcli/auth: reject weak
 client challenges in netlogon_creds_server_init()

This implements the note from MS-NRPC 3.1.4.1 Session-Key Negotiation:

7. If none of the first 5 bytes of the client challenge is unique, the
    server MUST fail session-key negotiation without further processing of
    the following steps.

It lets ./zerologon_tester.py from
https://github.com/SecuraBV/CVE-2020-1472.git
report: "Attack failed. Target is probably patched."

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14497

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
---
 libcli/auth/credentials.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 libcli/auth/wscript_build |  2 +-
 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/libcli/auth/credentials.c b/libcli/auth/credentials.c
index dce0a9151e9..0ba1d95afd3 100644
--- a/libcli/auth/credentials.c
+++ b/libcli/auth/credentials.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #include "../lib/crypto/crypto.h"
 #include "libcli/auth/libcli_auth.h"
 #include "../libcli/security/dom_sid.h"
+#include "lib/util/util_str_escape.h"
 
 #include "lib/crypto/gnutls_helpers.h"
 #include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
@@ -534,6 +535,7 @@ struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *netlogon_creds_server_init(TALLOC_CTX *me
 {
 
 	struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *creds = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState);
+	bool ok;
 
 	if (!creds) {
 		return NULL;
@@ -546,6 +548,20 @@ struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *netlogon_creds_server_init(TALLOC_CTX *me
 	dump_data_pw("Server chall", server_challenge->data, sizeof(server_challenge->data));
 	dump_data_pw("Machine Pass", machine_password->hash, sizeof(machine_password->hash));
 
+	ok = netlogon_creds_is_random_challenge(client_challenge);
+	if (!ok) {
+		DBG_WARNING("CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): "
+			    "non-random client challenge rejected for "
+			    "client_account[%s] client_computer_name[%s]\n",
+			    log_escape(mem_ctx, client_account),
+			    log_escape(mem_ctx, client_computer_name));
+		dump_data(DBGLVL_WARNING,
+			  client_challenge->data,
+			  sizeof(client_challenge->data));
+		talloc_free(creds);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
 	creds->computer_name = talloc_strdup(creds, client_computer_name);
 	if (!creds->computer_name) {
 		talloc_free(creds);
diff --git a/libcli/auth/wscript_build b/libcli/auth/wscript_build
index 04e2b09eadf..6f7d9a76404 100644
--- a/libcli/auth/wscript_build
+++ b/libcli/auth/wscript_build
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ bld.SAMBA_SUBSYSTEM('NTLM_CHECK',
 
 bld.SAMBA_SUBSYSTEM('LIBCLI_AUTH',
 	source='credentials.c session.c smbencrypt.c smbdes.c',
-	public_deps='MSRPC_PARSE gnutls GNUTLS_HELPERS',
+	public_deps='MSRPC_PARSE gnutls GNUTLS_HELPERS util_str_escape',
 	public_headers='credentials.h:domain_credentials.h'
 	)
 
-- 
2.20.1

From ed3db31d40f4f275deb9c3878250bee0c4d3af6e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2020 19:20:25 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 08/19] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): s4:rpc_server/netlogon:
 protect netr_ServerPasswordSet2 against unencrypted passwords

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14497

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
---
 source4/rpc_server/netlogon/dcerpc_netlogon.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 59 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/source4/rpc_server/netlogon/dcerpc_netlogon.c b/source4/rpc_server/netlogon/dcerpc_netlogon.c
index bb97e86055a..a8d8d95130f 100644
--- a/source4/rpc_server/netlogon/dcerpc_netlogon.c
+++ b/source4/rpc_server/netlogon/dcerpc_netlogon.c
@@ -721,7 +721,10 @@ static NTSTATUS dcesrv_netr_ServerPasswordSet2(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_cal
 	struct NL_PASSWORD_VERSION version = {};
 	const uint32_t *new_version = NULL;
 	NTSTATUS nt_status;
-	DATA_BLOB new_password;
+	DATA_BLOB new_password = data_blob_null;
+	size_t confounder_len;
+	DATA_BLOB dec_blob = data_blob_null;
+	DATA_BLOB enc_blob = data_blob_null;
 	int ret;
 	struct samr_CryptPassword password_buf;
 
@@ -784,6 +787,61 @@ static NTSTATUS dcesrv_netr_ServerPasswordSet2(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_cal
 		return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Make sure the length field was encrypted,
+	 * otherwise we are under attack.
+	 */
+	if (new_password.length == r->in.new_password->length) {
+		DBG_WARNING("Length[%zu] field not encrypted\n",
+			    new_password.length);
+		return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * We don't allow empty passwords for machine accounts.
+	 */
+	if (new_password.length < 2) {
+		DBG_WARNING("Empty password Length[%zu]\n",
+			    new_password.length);
+		return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Make sure the confounder part of CryptPassword
+	 * buffer was encrypted, otherwise we are under attack.
+	 */
+	confounder_len = 512 - new_password.length;
+	enc_blob = data_blob_const(r->in.new_password->data, confounder_len);
+	dec_blob = data_blob_const(password_buf.data, confounder_len);
+	if (data_blob_cmp(&dec_blob, &enc_blob) == 0) {
+		DBG_WARNING("Confounder buffer not encrypted Length[%zu]\n",
+			    confounder_len);
+		return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Check that the password part was actually encrypted,
+	 * otherwise we are under attack.
+	 */
+	enc_blob = data_blob_const(r->in.new_password->data + confounder_len,
+				   new_password.length);
+	dec_blob = data_blob_const(password_buf.data + confounder_len,
+				   new_password.length);
+	if (data_blob_cmp(&dec_blob, &enc_blob) == 0) {
+		DBG_WARNING("Password buffer not encrypted Length[%zu]\n",
+			    new_password.length);
+		return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * don't allow zero buffers
+	 */
+	if (all_zero(new_password.data, new_password.length)) {
+		DBG_WARNING("Password zero buffer Length[%zu]\n",
+			    new_password.length);
+		return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+	}
+
 	/* fetch the old password hashes (at least one of both has to exist) */
 
 	ret = gendb_search(sam_ctx, mem_ctx, NULL, &res, attrs,
-- 
2.20.1

From af7a88e34f7d74c0114f893f12aa36d6bc72d85f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2020 12:48:21 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 09/19] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): s3:rpc_server/netlogon: Fix
 mem leak onto p->mem_ctx in error path of _netr_ServerPasswordSet2().

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14497

Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>

[dbagnall@samba.org, abartlet@samba.org: adapt for indentation
changes]
---
 source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c b/source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c
index 3894eecd7ae..bc5ec654a95 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c
@@ -1364,6 +1364,7 @@ NTSTATUS _netr_ServerPasswordSet2(struct pipes_struct *p,
 						      password_buf.data,
 						      516);
 		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+			TALLOC_FREE(creds);
 			return status;
 		}
 	}
-- 
2.20.1

From 371bc578c37e100585928adc2edf1a7f973d8aa3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2020 12:53:50 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 10/19] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): s3:rpc_server/netlogon:
 protect netr_ServerPasswordSet2 against unencrypted passwords

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14497

Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>

Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
---
 source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c | 98 +++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 92 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c b/source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c
index bc5ec654a95..3ffdde34142 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c
@@ -1325,9 +1325,14 @@ NTSTATUS _netr_ServerPasswordSet2(struct pipes_struct *p,
 {
 	NTSTATUS status;
 	struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *creds = NULL;
-	DATA_BLOB plaintext;
+	DATA_BLOB plaintext = data_blob_null;
+	DATA_BLOB new_password = data_blob_null;
+	size_t confounder_len;
+	DATA_BLOB dec_blob = data_blob_null;
+	DATA_BLOB enc_blob = data_blob_null;
 	struct samr_CryptPassword password_buf;
 	struct _samr_Credentials_t cr = { CRED_TYPE_PLAIN_TEXT, {0}};
+	bool ok;
 
 	become_root();
 	status = netr_creds_server_step_check(p, p->mem_ctx,
@@ -1369,18 +1374,99 @@ NTSTATUS _netr_ServerPasswordSet2(struct pipes_struct *p,
 		}
 	}
 
-	if (!decode_pw_buffer(p->mem_ctx,
-			      password_buf.data,
-			      (char**) &plaintext.data,
-			      &plaintext.length,
-			      CH_UTF16)) {
+	if (!extract_pw_from_buffer(p->mem_ctx, password_buf.data, &new_password)) {
 		DEBUG(2,("_netr_ServerPasswordSet2: unable to extract password "
 			 "from a buffer. Rejecting auth request as a wrong password\n"));
 		TALLOC_FREE(creds);
 		return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Make sure the length field was encrypted,
+	 * otherwise we are under attack.
+	 */
+	if (new_password.length == r->in.new_password->length) {
+		DBG_WARNING("Length[%zu] field not encrypted\n",
+			new_password.length);
+		TALLOC_FREE(creds);
+		return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * We don't allow empty passwords for machine accounts.
+	 */
+	if (new_password.length < 2) {
+		DBG_WARNING("Empty password Length[%zu]\n",
+			new_password.length);
+		TALLOC_FREE(creds);
+		return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Make sure the confounder part of CryptPassword
+	 * buffer was encrypted, otherwise we are under attack.
+	 */
+	confounder_len = 512 - new_password.length;
+	enc_blob = data_blob_const(r->in.new_password->data, confounder_len);
+	dec_blob = data_blob_const(password_buf.data, confounder_len);
+	if (data_blob_cmp(&dec_blob, &enc_blob) == 0) {
+		DBG_WARNING("Confounder buffer not encrypted Length[%zu]\n",
+			    confounder_len);
+		TALLOC_FREE(creds);
+		return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Check that the password part was actually encrypted,
+	 * otherwise we are under attack.
+	 */
+	enc_blob = data_blob_const(r->in.new_password->data + confounder_len,
+				   new_password.length);
+	dec_blob = data_blob_const(password_buf.data + confounder_len,
+				   new_password.length);
+	if (data_blob_cmp(&dec_blob, &enc_blob) == 0) {
+		DBG_WARNING("Password buffer not encrypted Length[%zu]\n",
+			    new_password.length);
+		TALLOC_FREE(creds);
+		return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * don't allow zero buffers
+	 */
+	if (all_zero(new_password.data, new_password.length)) {
+		DBG_WARNING("Password zero buffer Length[%zu]\n",
+			    new_password.length);
+		TALLOC_FREE(creds);
+		return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+	}
+
+	/* Convert from UTF16 -> plaintext. */
+	ok = convert_string_talloc(p->mem_ctx,
+				CH_UTF16,
+				CH_UNIX,
+				new_password.data,
+				new_password.length,
+				(void *)&plaintext.data,
+				&plaintext.length);
+	if (!ok) {
+		DBG_WARNING("unable to extract password from a buffer. "
+			    "Rejecting auth request as a wrong password\n");
+		TALLOC_FREE(creds);
+		return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * We don't allow empty passwords for machine accounts.
+	 */
+
 	cr.creds.password = (const char*) plaintext.data;
+	if (strlen(cr.creds.password) == 0) {
+		DBG_WARNING("Empty plaintext password\n");
+		TALLOC_FREE(creds);
+		return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD;
+	}
+
 	status = netr_set_machine_account_password(p->mem_ctx,
 						   p->session_info,
 						   p->msg_ctx,
-- 
2.20.1

From 6feafd85989b7ed7161e6a05e22127d88df5311a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2020 10:18:45 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 11/19] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): s4:rpc_server/netlogon:
 refactor dcesrv_netr_creds_server_step_check()

We should debug more details about the failing request.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14497

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
---
 source4/rpc_server/netlogon/dcerpc_netlogon.c | 45 ++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/source4/rpc_server/netlogon/dcerpc_netlogon.c b/source4/rpc_server/netlogon/dcerpc_netlogon.c
index a8d8d95130f..afc0687b882 100644
--- a/source4/rpc_server/netlogon/dcerpc_netlogon.c
+++ b/source4/rpc_server/netlogon/dcerpc_netlogon.c
@@ -622,26 +622,47 @@ static NTSTATUS dcesrv_netr_creds_server_step_check(struct dcesrv_call_state *dc
 	NTSTATUS nt_status;
 	int schannel = lpcfg_server_schannel(dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx);
 	bool schannel_global_required = (schannel == true);
+	struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *creds = NULL;
+	enum dcerpc_AuthType auth_type = DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_NONE;
+	uint16_t opnum = dce_call->pkt.u.request.opnum;
+	const char *opname = "<unknown>";
 
-	if (schannel_global_required) {
-		enum dcerpc_AuthType auth_type = DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_NONE;
-
-		dcesrv_call_auth_info(dce_call, &auth_type, NULL);
-
-		if (auth_type != DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_SCHANNEL) {
-			DBG_ERR("[%s] is not using schannel\n",
-				computer_name);
-			return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
-		}
+	if (opnum < ndr_table_netlogon.num_calls) {
+		opname = ndr_table_netlogon.calls[opnum].name;
 	}
 
+	dcesrv_call_auth_info(dce_call, &auth_type, NULL);
+
 	nt_status = schannel_check_creds_state(mem_ctx,
 					       dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx,
 					       computer_name,
 					       received_authenticator,
 					       return_authenticator,
-					       creds_out);
-	return nt_status;
+					       &creds);
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
+		ZERO_STRUCTP(return_authenticator);
+		return nt_status;
+	}
+
+	if (schannel_global_required) {
+		if (auth_type == DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_SCHANNEL) {
+			*creds_out = creds;
+			return NT_STATUS_OK;
+		}
+
+		DBG_ERR("CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): "
+			"%s request (opnum[%u]) without schannel from "
+			"client_account[%s] client_computer_name[%s]\n",
+			opname, opnum,
+			log_escape(mem_ctx, creds->account_name),
+			log_escape(mem_ctx, creds->computer_name));
+		TALLOC_FREE(creds);
+		ZERO_STRUCTP(return_authenticator);
+		return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+	}
+
+	*creds_out = creds;
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
 }
 
 /*
-- 
2.20.1

From 7de059592c05b90d39f25e5ab68bf9c2bbe63687 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2020 10:56:53 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 12/19] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): s4:rpc_server/netlogon:
 support "server require schannel:WORKSTATION$ = no"

This allows to add expections for individual workstations, when using "server schannel = yes".
"server schannel = auto" is very insecure and will be removed soon.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14497

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
---
 source4/rpc_server/netlogon/dcerpc_netlogon.c | 9 ++++++++-
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/source4/rpc_server/netlogon/dcerpc_netlogon.c b/source4/rpc_server/netlogon/dcerpc_netlogon.c
index afc0687b882..051513adc08 100644
--- a/source4/rpc_server/netlogon/dcerpc_netlogon.c
+++ b/source4/rpc_server/netlogon/dcerpc_netlogon.c
@@ -622,6 +622,7 @@ static NTSTATUS dcesrv_netr_creds_server_step_check(struct dcesrv_call_state *dc
 	NTSTATUS nt_status;
 	int schannel = lpcfg_server_schannel(dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx);
 	bool schannel_global_required = (schannel == true);
+	bool schannel_required = schannel_global_required;
 	struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *creds = NULL;
 	enum dcerpc_AuthType auth_type = DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_NONE;
 	uint16_t opnum = dce_call->pkt.u.request.opnum;
@@ -644,7 +645,13 @@ static NTSTATUS dcesrv_netr_creds_server_step_check(struct dcesrv_call_state *dc
 		return nt_status;
 	}
 
-	if (schannel_global_required) {
+	schannel_required = lpcfg_parm_bool(dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx,
+					    NULL,
+					    "server require schannel",
+					    creds->account_name,
+					    schannel_global_required);
+
+	if (schannel_required) {
 		if (auth_type == DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_SCHANNEL) {
 			*creds_out = creds;
 			return NT_STATUS_OK;
-- 
2.20.1

From b34956527a4bfec04f425e580d5b020ceccbce2b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2020 13:37:26 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 13/19] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): s4:rpc_server/netlogon: log
 warnings about unsecure configurations
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

This should give admins wawrnings until they have a secure
configuration.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14497

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
---
 source4/rpc_server/netlogon/dcerpc_netlogon.c | 66 ++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 63 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/source4/rpc_server/netlogon/dcerpc_netlogon.c b/source4/rpc_server/netlogon/dcerpc_netlogon.c
index 051513adc08..63e2821cac7 100644
--- a/source4/rpc_server/netlogon/dcerpc_netlogon.c
+++ b/source4/rpc_server/netlogon/dcerpc_netlogon.c
@@ -623,10 +623,12 @@ static NTSTATUS dcesrv_netr_creds_server_step_check(struct dcesrv_call_state *dc
 	int schannel = lpcfg_server_schannel(dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx);
 	bool schannel_global_required = (schannel == true);
 	bool schannel_required = schannel_global_required;
+	const char *explicit_opt = NULL;
 	struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *creds = NULL;
 	enum dcerpc_AuthType auth_type = DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_NONE;
 	uint16_t opnum = dce_call->pkt.u.request.opnum;
 	const char *opname = "<unknown>";
+	static bool warned_global_once = false;
 
 	if (opnum < ndr_table_netlogon.num_calls) {
 		opname = ndr_table_netlogon.calls[opnum].name;
@@ -645,11 +647,18 @@ static NTSTATUS dcesrv_netr_creds_server_step_check(struct dcesrv_call_state *dc
 		return nt_status;
 	}
 
-	schannel_required = lpcfg_parm_bool(dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx,
+	/*
+	 * We don't use lpcfg_parm_bool(), as we
+	 * need the explicit_opt pointer in order to
+	 * adjust the debug messages.
+	 */
+	explicit_opt = lpcfg_get_parametric(dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx,
 					    NULL,
 					    "server require schannel",
-					    creds->account_name,
-					    schannel_global_required);
+					    creds->account_name);
+	if (explicit_opt != NULL) {
+		schannel_required = lp_bool(explicit_opt);
+	}
 
 	if (schannel_required) {
 		if (auth_type == DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_SCHANNEL) {
@@ -663,11 +672,62 @@ static NTSTATUS dcesrv_netr_creds_server_step_check(struct dcesrv_call_state *dc
 			opname, opnum,
 			log_escape(mem_ctx, creds->account_name),
 			log_escape(mem_ctx, creds->computer_name));
+		DBG_ERR("CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): Check if option "
+			"'server require schannel:%s = no' is needed! \n",
+			log_escape(mem_ctx, creds->account_name));
 		TALLOC_FREE(creds);
 		ZERO_STRUCTP(return_authenticator);
 		return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
 	}
 
+	if (!schannel_global_required && !warned_global_once) {
+		/*
+		 * We want admins to notice their misconfiguration!
+		 */
+		DBG_ERR("CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): "
+			"Please configure 'server schannel = yes', "
+			"See https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14497\n");
+		warned_global_once = true;
+	}
+
+	if (auth_type == DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_SCHANNEL) {
+		DBG_ERR("CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): "
+			"%s request (opnum[%u]) WITH schannel from "
+			"client_account[%s] client_computer_name[%s]\n",
+			opname, opnum,
+			log_escape(mem_ctx, creds->account_name),
+			log_escape(mem_ctx, creds->computer_name));
+		DBG_ERR("CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): "
+			"Option 'server require schannel:%s = no' not needed!?\n",
+			log_escape(mem_ctx, creds->account_name));
+
+		*creds_out = creds;
+		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+	}
+
+
+	if (explicit_opt != NULL) {
+		DBG_INFO("CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): "
+			 "%s request (opnum[%u]) without schannel from "
+			 "client_account[%s] client_computer_name[%s]\n",
+			 opname, opnum,
+			 log_escape(mem_ctx, creds->account_name),
+			 log_escape(mem_ctx, creds->computer_name));
+		DBG_INFO("CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): "
+			 "Option 'server require schannel:%s = no' still needed!\n",
+			 log_escape(mem_ctx, creds->account_name));
+	} else {
+		DBG_ERR("CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): "
+			"%s request (opnum[%u]) without schannel from "
+			"client_account[%s] client_computer_name[%s]\n",
+			opname, opnum,
+			log_escape(mem_ctx, creds->account_name),
+			log_escape(mem_ctx, creds->computer_name));
+		DBG_ERR("CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): Check if option "
+			"'server require schannel:%s = no' might be needed!\n",
+			log_escape(mem_ctx, creds->account_name));
+	}
+
 	*creds_out = creds;
 	return NT_STATUS_OK;
 }
-- 
2.20.1

From fd3dbd91610c3d752be7355d64fa80389e0f75df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?G=C3=BCnther=20Deschner?= <gd@samba.org>
Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2020 14:57:22 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 14/19] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): s3:rpc_server/netlogon:
 refactor dcesrv_netr_creds_server_step_check()
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

We should debug more details about the failing request.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14497

Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>

Signed-off-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
---
 source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c b/source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c
index 3ffdde34142..d1ce1e94cb5 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@
 #include "../lib/tsocket/tsocket.h"
 #include "lib/param/param.h"
 #include "libsmb/dsgetdcname.h"
+#include "lib/util/util_str_escape.h"
 
 extern userdom_struct current_user_info;
 
@@ -1072,19 +1073,21 @@ static NTSTATUS netr_creds_server_step_check(struct pipes_struct *p,
 	NTSTATUS status;
 	bool schannel_global_required = (lp_server_schannel() == true) ? true:false;
 	struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx;
+	struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *creds = NULL;
+	enum dcerpc_AuthType auth_type = DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_NONE;
+	uint16_t opnum = p->opnum;
+	const char *opname = "<unknown>";
 
 	if (creds_out != NULL) {
 		*creds_out = NULL;
 	}
 
-	if (schannel_global_required) {
-		if (p->auth.auth_type != DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_SCHANNEL) {
-			DBG_ERR("[%s] is not using schannel\n",
-				computer_name);
-			return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
-		}
+	if (opnum < ndr_table_netlogon.num_calls) {
+		opname = ndr_table_netlogon.calls[opnum].name;
 	}
 
+	auth_type = p->auth.auth_type;
+
 	lp_ctx = loadparm_init_s3(mem_ctx, loadparm_s3_helpers());
 	if (lp_ctx == NULL) {
 		DEBUG(0, ("loadparm_init_s3 failed\n"));
@@ -1093,9 +1096,33 @@ static NTSTATUS netr_creds_server_step_check(struct pipes_struct *p,
 
 	status = schannel_check_creds_state(mem_ctx, lp_ctx,
 					    computer_name, received_authenticator,
-					    return_authenticator, creds_out);
+					    return_authenticator, &creds);
 	talloc_unlink(mem_ctx, lp_ctx);
-	return status;
+
+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+		ZERO_STRUCTP(return_authenticator);
+		return status;
+	}
+
+	if (schannel_global_required) {
+		if (auth_type == DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_SCHANNEL) {
+			*creds_out = creds;
+			return NT_STATUS_OK;
+		}
+
+		DBG_ERR("CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): "
+			"%s request (opnum[%u]) without schannel from "
+			"client_account[%s] client_computer_name[%s]\n",
+			opname, opnum,
+			log_escape(mem_ctx, creds->account_name),
+			log_escape(mem_ctx, creds->computer_name));
+		TALLOC_FREE(creds);
+		ZERO_STRUCTP(return_authenticator);
+		return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
+	}
+
+	*creds_out = creds;
+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
 }
 
 
-- 
2.20.1

From 8bc4e26883b3fe629bbf0b3bf8e773d34ba31916 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?G=C3=BCnther=20Deschner?= <gd@samba.org>
Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2020 14:23:16 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 15/19] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): s3:rpc_server/netlogon:
 support "server require schannel:WORKSTATION$ = no"
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

This allows to add expections for individual workstations, when using "server schannel = yes".
"server schannel = auto" is very insecure and will be removed soon.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14497

Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>

Signed-off-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
---
 source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c | 7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c b/source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c
index d1ce1e94cb5..63dd9dc0d5f 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c
@@ -1072,6 +1072,7 @@ static NTSTATUS netr_creds_server_step_check(struct pipes_struct *p,
 {
 	NTSTATUS status;
 	bool schannel_global_required = (lp_server_schannel() == true) ? true:false;
+	bool schannel_required = schannel_global_required;
 	struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx;
 	struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *creds = NULL;
 	enum dcerpc_AuthType auth_type = DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_NONE;
@@ -1104,7 +1105,11 @@ static NTSTATUS netr_creds_server_step_check(struct pipes_struct *p,
 		return status;
 	}
 
-	if (schannel_global_required) {
+	schannel_required = lp_parm_bool(GLOBAL_SECTION_SNUM,
+					 "server require schannel",
+					 creds->account_name,
+					 schannel_global_required);
+	if (schannel_required) {
 		if (auth_type == DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_SCHANNEL) {
 			*creds_out = creds;
 			return NT_STATUS_OK;
-- 
2.20.1

From 8d77df7f9c963ca7d13ee0d8495744e8a54e4404 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?G=C3=BCnther=20Deschner?= <gd@samba.org>
Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2020 14:42:52 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 16/19] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): s3:rpc_server/netlogon: log
 warnings about unsecure configurations
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14497

Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>

Signed-off-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
---
 source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c | 70 +++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 66 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c b/source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c
index 63dd9dc0d5f..3221ebaa2e2 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c
@@ -1073,11 +1073,13 @@ static NTSTATUS netr_creds_server_step_check(struct pipes_struct *p,
 	NTSTATUS status;
 	bool schannel_global_required = (lp_server_schannel() == true) ? true:false;
 	bool schannel_required = schannel_global_required;
+	const char *explicit_opt = NULL;
 	struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx;
 	struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *creds = NULL;
 	enum dcerpc_AuthType auth_type = DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_NONE;
 	uint16_t opnum = p->opnum;
 	const char *opname = "<unknown>";
+	static bool warned_global_once = false;
 
 	if (creds_out != NULL) {
 		*creds_out = NULL;
@@ -1105,10 +1107,20 @@ static NTSTATUS netr_creds_server_step_check(struct pipes_struct *p,
 		return status;
 	}
 
-	schannel_required = lp_parm_bool(GLOBAL_SECTION_SNUM,
-					 "server require schannel",
-					 creds->account_name,
-					 schannel_global_required);
+	/*
+	 * We don't use lp_parm_bool(), as we
+	 * need the explicit_opt pointer in order to
+	 * adjust the debug messages.
+	 */
+
+	explicit_opt = lp_parm_const_string(GLOBAL_SECTION_SNUM,
+					    "server require schannel",
+					    creds->account_name,
+					    NULL);
+	if (explicit_opt != NULL) {
+		schannel_required = lp_bool(explicit_opt);
+	}
+
 	if (schannel_required) {
 		if (auth_type == DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_SCHANNEL) {
 			*creds_out = creds;
@@ -1121,11 +1133,61 @@ static NTSTATUS netr_creds_server_step_check(struct pipes_struct *p,
 			opname, opnum,
 			log_escape(mem_ctx, creds->account_name),
 			log_escape(mem_ctx, creds->computer_name));
+		DBG_ERR("CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): Check if option "
+			"'server require schannel:%s = no' is needed! \n",
+			log_escape(mem_ctx, creds->account_name));
 		TALLOC_FREE(creds);
 		ZERO_STRUCTP(return_authenticator);
 		return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
 	}
 
+	if (!schannel_global_required && !warned_global_once) {
+		/*
+		 * We want admins to notice their misconfiguration!
+		 */
+		DBG_ERR("CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): "
+			"Please configure 'server schannel = yes', "
+			"See https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14497\n");
+		warned_global_once = true;
+	}
+
+	if (auth_type == DCERPC_AUTH_TYPE_SCHANNEL) {
+		DBG_ERR("CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): "
+			"%s request (opnum[%u]) WITH schannel from "
+			"client_account[%s] client_computer_name[%s]\n",
+			opname, opnum,
+			log_escape(mem_ctx, creds->account_name),
+			log_escape(mem_ctx, creds->computer_name));
+		DBG_ERR("CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): "
+			"Option 'server require schannel:%s = no' not needed!?\n",
+			log_escape(mem_ctx, creds->account_name));
+
+		*creds_out = creds;
+		return NT_STATUS_OK;
+	}
+
+	if (explicit_opt != NULL) {
+		DBG_INFO("CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): "
+			 "%s request (opnum[%u]) without schannel from "
+			 "client_account[%s] client_computer_name[%s]\n",
+			 opname, opnum,
+			 log_escape(mem_ctx, creds->account_name),
+			 log_escape(mem_ctx, creds->computer_name));
+		DBG_INFO("CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): "
+			 "Option 'server require schannel:%s = no' still needed!\n",
+			 log_escape(mem_ctx, creds->account_name));
+	} else {
+		DBG_ERR("CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): "
+			"%s request (opnum[%u]) without schannel from "
+			"client_account[%s] client_computer_name[%s]\n",
+			opname, opnum,
+			log_escape(mem_ctx, creds->account_name),
+			log_escape(mem_ctx, creds->computer_name));
+		DBG_ERR("CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): Check if option "
+			"'server require schannel:%s = no' might be needed!\n",
+			log_escape(mem_ctx, creds->account_name));
+	}
+
 	*creds_out = creds;
 	return NT_STATUS_OK;
 }
-- 
2.20.1

From d5f5dcfec850a4717cce9c27b9dd01fd841813d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2020 17:27:54 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 17/19] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): docs-xml: document 'server
 require schannel:COMPUTERACCOUNT'

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14497

Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
---
 .../smbdotconf/security/serverschannel.xml    | 69 +++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 54 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/serverschannel.xml b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/serverschannel.xml
index 489492d79b1..b682d086f76 100644
--- a/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/serverschannel.xml
+++ b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/security/serverschannel.xml
@@ -7,26 +7,65 @@
 <description>
 
     <para>
-	This option is deprecated with Samba 4.8 and will be removed in future.
-	At the same time the default changed to yes, which will be the
-	hardcoded behavior in future. If you have the need for the behavior of "auto"
-	to be kept, please file a bug at https://bugzilla.samba.org.
+	This option is deprecated and will be removed in future,
+	as it is a security problem if not set to "yes" (which will be
+	the hardcoded behavior in future).
     </para>
 
     <para>
-	This controls whether the server offers or even demands the use of the netlogon schannel.
-	<smbconfoption name="server schannel">no</smbconfoption> does not offer the schannel, <smbconfoption
-	name="server schannel">auto</smbconfoption> offers the schannel but does not enforce it, and <smbconfoption
-	name="server schannel">yes</smbconfoption> denies access if the client is not able to speak netlogon schannel.
-	This is only the case for Windows NT4 before SP4.
-	</para>
-
+	Samba will complain in the log files at log level 0,
+	about the security problem if the option is not set to "yes".
+    </para>
     <para>
-	Please note that with this set to <literal>no</literal>, you will have to apply the WindowsXP
-	<filename>WinXP_SignOrSeal.reg</filename> registry patch found in the docs/registry subdirectory of the Samba distribution tarball.
-	</para>
+	See CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon) https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14497
+    </para>
+
+    <para>If you still have legacy domain members use the <smbconfoption name="server require schannel:COMPUTERACCOUNT"/> option.
+    </para>
+
+    <para>This option yields precedence to the <smbconfoption name="server require schannel:COMPUTERACCOUNT"/> option.</para>
+
 </description>
 
 <value type="default">yes</value>
-<value type="example">auto</value>
+</samba:parameter>
+
+<samba:parameter name="server require schannel:COMPUTERACCOUNT"
+                 context="G"
+                 type="string"
+                 xmlns:samba="http://www.samba.org/samba/DTD/samba-doc">
+<description>
+
+    <para>If you still have legacy domain members, which required "server schannel = auto" before,
+	it is possible to specify explicit expection per computer account
+	by using 'server require schannel:COMPUTERACCOUNT = no' as option.
+	Note that COMPUTERACCOUNT has to be the sAMAccountName value of
+	the computer account (including the trailing '$' sign).
+    </para>
+
+    <para>
+	Samba will complain in the log files at log level 0,
+	about the security problem if the option is not set to "no",
+	but the related computer is actually using the netlogon
+	secure channel (schannel) feature.
+    </para>
+
+    <para>
+	Samba will warn in the log files at log level 5,
+	if a setting is still needed for the specified computer account.
+    </para>
+
+    <para>
+	See CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon) https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14497
+    </para>
+
+    <para>This option takes precedence to the <smbconfoption name="server schannel"/> option.</para>
+
+    <programlisting>
+	server require schannel:LEGACYCOMPUTER1$ = no
+	server require schannel:NASBOX$ = no
+	server require schannel:LEGACYCOMPUTER2$ = no
+    </programlisting>
+</description>
+
 </samba:parameter>
-- 
2.20.1

From c33b2a69a80f6b543a6acb382a9fe8b178be379f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Date: Fri, 18 Sep 2020 12:39:54 +1200
Subject: [PATCH 18/19] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): s4 torture rpc: Test empty
 machine acct pwd

Ensure that an empty machine account password can't be set by
netr_ServerPasswordSet2

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14497

Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
---
 source4/torture/rpc/netlogon.c | 64 +++++++++++++++-------------------
 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)

diff --git a/source4/torture/rpc/netlogon.c b/source4/torture/rpc/netlogon.c
index f966ff6865b..d4bf8ccadbe 100644
--- a/source4/torture/rpc/netlogon.c
+++ b/source4/torture/rpc/netlogon.c
@@ -725,45 +725,39 @@ static bool test_SetPassword2_with_flags(struct torture_context *tctx,
 
 	cli_credentials_set_password(machine_credentials, password, CRED_SPECIFIED);
 
-	if (!torture_setting_bool(tctx, "dangerous", false)) {
-		torture_comment(tctx,
-			"Not testing ability to set password to '', enable dangerous tests to perform this test\n");
+	/*
+	 * As a consequence of CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon)
+	 * Samba explicitly disallows the setting of an empty machine account
+	 * password.
+	 *
+	 * Note that this may fail against Windows, and leave a machine account
+	 * with an empty password.
+	 */
+	password = "";
+	encode_pw_buffer(password_buf.data, password, STR_UNICODE);
+	if (creds->negotiate_flags & NETLOGON_NEG_SUPPORTS_AES) {
+		netlogon_creds_aes_encrypt(creds, password_buf.data, 516);
 	} else {
-		/* by changing the machine password to ""
-		 * we check if the server uses password restrictions
-		 * for ServerPasswordSet2
-		 * (win2k3 accepts "")
-		 */
-		password = "";
-		encode_pw_buffer(password_buf.data, password, STR_UNICODE);
-		if (creds->negotiate_flags & NETLOGON_NEG_SUPPORTS_AES) {
-			netlogon_creds_aes_encrypt(creds, password_buf.data, 516);
-		} else {
-			netlogon_creds_arcfour_crypt(creds, password_buf.data, 516);
-		}
-		memcpy(new_password.data, password_buf.data, 512);
-		new_password.length = IVAL(password_buf.data, 512);
-
-		torture_comment(tctx,
-			"Testing ServerPasswordSet2 on machine account\n");
-		torture_comment(tctx,
-			"Changing machine account password to '%s'\n", password);
-
-		netlogon_creds_client_authenticator(creds, &credential);
-
-		torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, dcerpc_netr_ServerPasswordSet2_r(b, tctx, &r),
-			"ServerPasswordSet2 failed");
-		torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, r.out.result, "ServerPasswordSet2 failed");
+		netlogon_creds_arcfour_crypt(creds, password_buf.data, 516);
+	}
+	memcpy(new_password.data, password_buf.data, 512);
+	new_password.length = IVAL(password_buf.data, 512);
 
-		if (!netlogon_creds_client_check(creds, &r.out.return_authenticator->cred)) {
-			torture_comment(tctx, "Credential chaining failed\n");
-		}
+	torture_comment(tctx,
+		"Testing ServerPasswordSet2 on machine account\n");
+	torture_comment(tctx,
+		"Changing machine account password to '%s'\n", password);
 
-		cli_credentials_set_password(machine_credentials, password, CRED_SPECIFIED);
-	}
+	netlogon_creds_client_authenticator(creds, &credential);
 
-	torture_assert(tctx, test_SetupCredentials(p, tctx, machine_credentials, &creds),
-		"ServerPasswordSet failed to actually change the password");
+	torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(
+		tctx, dcerpc_netr_ServerPasswordSet2_r(b, tctx, &r),
+		"ServerPasswordSet2 failed");
+	torture_assert_ntstatus_equal(
+		tctx,
+		r.out.result,
+		NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD,
+		"ServerPasswordSet2 did not return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD");
 
 	/* now try a random password */
 	password = generate_random_password(tctx, 8, 255);
-- 
2.20.1

From 167aeb8f9e665201e8f94a68f7749953a96f50cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Date: Fri, 18 Sep 2020 15:57:34 +1200
Subject: [PATCH 19/19] CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon): s4 torture rpc: repeated
 bytes in client challenge

Ensure that client challenges with the first 5 bytes identical are
rejected.

BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14497

Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>

[abartlet@samba.org: backported from master as test order was flipped]
---
 source4/torture/rpc/netlogon.c | 335 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 335 insertions(+)

diff --git a/source4/torture/rpc/netlogon.c b/source4/torture/rpc/netlogon.c
index d4bf8ccadbe..da4d407c627 100644
--- a/source4/torture/rpc/netlogon.c
+++ b/source4/torture/rpc/netlogon.c
@@ -486,6 +486,325 @@ bool test_SetupCredentialsPipe(const struct dcerpc_pipe *p1,
 	return true;
 }
 
+static bool test_ServerReqChallenge(
+	struct torture_context *tctx,
+	struct dcerpc_pipe *p,
+	struct cli_credentials *credentials)
+{
+	struct netr_ServerReqChallenge r;
+	struct netr_Credential credentials1, credentials2, credentials3;
+	const char *machine_name;
+	struct dcerpc_binding_handle *b = p->binding_handle;
+	struct netr_ServerAuthenticate2 a;
+	uint32_t in_negotiate_flags = NETLOGON_NEG_AUTH2_ADS_FLAGS;
+	uint32_t out_negotiate_flags = 0;
+	const struct samr_Password *mach_password = NULL;
+	enum netr_SchannelType sec_chan_type = 0;
+	struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *creds = NULL;
+	const char *account_name = NULL;
+
+	machine_name = cli_credentials_get_workstation(credentials);
+	mach_password = cli_credentials_get_nt_hash(credentials, tctx);
+	account_name = cli_credentials_get_username(credentials);
+	sec_chan_type = cli_credentials_get_secure_channel_type(credentials);
+
+	torture_comment(tctx, "Testing ServerReqChallenge\n");
+
+	r.in.server_name = NULL;
+	r.in.computer_name = machine_name;
+	r.in.credentials = &credentials1;
+	r.out.return_credentials = &credentials2;
+
+	netlogon_creds_random_challenge(&credentials1);
+
+	torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(
+		tctx,
+		dcerpc_netr_ServerReqChallenge_r(b, tctx, &r),
+		"ServerReqChallenge failed");
+	torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(
+		tctx,
+		r.out.result,
+		"ServerReqChallenge failed");
+	a.in.server_name = NULL;
+	a.in.account_name = account_name;
+	a.in.secure_channel_type = sec_chan_type;
+	a.in.computer_name = machine_name;
+	a.in.negotiate_flags = &in_negotiate_flags;
+	a.out.negotiate_flags = &out_negotiate_flags;
+	a.in.credentials = &credentials3;
+	a.out.return_credentials = &credentials3;
+
+	creds = netlogon_creds_client_init(tctx, a.in.account_name,
+					   a.in.computer_name,
+					   a.in.secure_channel_type,
+					   &credentials1, &credentials2,
+					   mach_password, &credentials3,
+					   in_negotiate_flags);
+
+	torture_assert(tctx, creds != NULL, "memory allocation");
+
+	torture_comment(tctx, "Testing ServerAuthenticate2\n");
+
+	torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(
+		tctx,
+		dcerpc_netr_ServerAuthenticate2_r(b, tctx, &a),
+		"ServerAuthenticate2 failed");
+	torture_assert_ntstatus_equal(
+		tctx,
+		a.out.result,
+		NT_STATUS_OK,
+		"ServerAuthenticate2 unexpected");
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool test_ServerReqChallenge_zero_challenge(
+	struct torture_context *tctx,
+	struct dcerpc_pipe *p,
+	struct cli_credentials *credentials)
+{
+	struct netr_ServerReqChallenge r;
+	struct netr_Credential credentials1, credentials2, credentials3;
+	const char *machine_name;
+	struct dcerpc_binding_handle *b = p->binding_handle;
+	struct netr_ServerAuthenticate2 a;
+	uint32_t in_negotiate_flags = NETLOGON_NEG_AUTH2_ADS_FLAGS;
+	uint32_t out_negotiate_flags = 0;
+	const struct samr_Password *mach_password = NULL;
+	enum netr_SchannelType sec_chan_type = 0;
+	struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *creds = NULL;
+	const char *account_name = NULL;
+
+	machine_name = cli_credentials_get_workstation(credentials);
+	mach_password = cli_credentials_get_nt_hash(credentials, tctx);
+	account_name = cli_credentials_get_username(credentials);
+	sec_chan_type = cli_credentials_get_secure_channel_type(credentials);
+
+	torture_comment(tctx, "Testing ServerReqChallenge\n");
+
+	r.in.server_name = NULL;
+	r.in.computer_name = machine_name;
+	r.in.credentials = &credentials1;
+	r.out.return_credentials = &credentials2;
+
+	/*
+	 * Set the client challenge to zero, this should fail
+	 * CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon)
+	 * BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14497
+	 */
+	ZERO_STRUCT(credentials1);
+
+	torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(
+		tctx,
+		dcerpc_netr_ServerReqChallenge_r(b, tctx, &r),
+		"ServerReqChallenge failed");
+	torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(
+		tctx,
+		r.out.result,
+		"ServerReqChallenge failed");
+	a.in.server_name = NULL;
+	a.in.account_name = account_name;
+	a.in.secure_channel_type = sec_chan_type;
+	a.in.computer_name = machine_name;
+	a.in.negotiate_flags = &in_negotiate_flags;
+	a.out.negotiate_flags = &out_negotiate_flags;
+	a.in.credentials = &credentials3;
+	a.out.return_credentials = &credentials3;
+
+	creds = netlogon_creds_client_init(tctx, a.in.account_name,
+					   a.in.computer_name,
+					   a.in.secure_channel_type,
+					   &credentials1, &credentials2,
+					   mach_password, &credentials3,
+					   in_negotiate_flags);
+
+	torture_assert(tctx, creds != NULL, "memory allocation");
+
+	torture_comment(tctx, "Testing ServerAuthenticate2\n");
+
+	torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(
+		tctx,
+		dcerpc_netr_ServerAuthenticate2_r(b, tctx, &a),
+		"ServerAuthenticate2 failed");
+	torture_assert_ntstatus_equal(
+		tctx,
+		a.out.result,
+		NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED,
+		"ServerAuthenticate2 unexpected");
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool test_ServerReqChallenge_5_repeats(
+	struct torture_context *tctx,
+	struct dcerpc_pipe *p,
+	struct cli_credentials *credentials)
+{
+	struct netr_ServerReqChallenge r;
+	struct netr_Credential credentials1, credentials2, credentials3;
+	const char *machine_name;
+	struct dcerpc_binding_handle *b = p->binding_handle;
+	struct netr_ServerAuthenticate2 a;
+	uint32_t in_negotiate_flags = NETLOGON_NEG_AUTH2_ADS_FLAGS;
+	uint32_t out_negotiate_flags = 0;
+	const struct samr_Password *mach_password = NULL;
+	enum netr_SchannelType sec_chan_type = 0;
+	struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *creds = NULL;
+	const char *account_name = NULL;
+
+	machine_name = cli_credentials_get_workstation(credentials);
+	mach_password = cli_credentials_get_nt_hash(credentials, tctx);
+	account_name = cli_credentials_get_username(credentials);
+	sec_chan_type = cli_credentials_get_secure_channel_type(credentials);
+
+	torture_comment(tctx, "Testing ServerReqChallenge\n");
+
+	r.in.server_name = NULL;
+	r.in.computer_name = machine_name;
+	r.in.credentials = &credentials1;
+	r.out.return_credentials = &credentials2;
+
+	/*
+	 * Set the first 5 bytes of the client challenge to the same value,
+	 * this should fail CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon)
+	 * BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14497
+	 */
+	credentials1.data[0] = 'A';
+	credentials1.data[1] = 'A';
+	credentials1.data[2] = 'A';
+	credentials1.data[3] = 'A';
+	credentials1.data[4] = 'A';
+	credentials1.data[5] = 'B';
+	credentials1.data[6] = 'C';
+	credentials1.data[7] = 'D';
+
+	torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(
+		tctx,
+		dcerpc_netr_ServerReqChallenge_r(b, tctx, &r),
+		"ServerReqChallenge failed");
+	torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(
+		tctx,
+		r.out.result,
+		"ServerReqChallenge failed");
+	a.in.server_name = NULL;
+	a.in.account_name = account_name;
+	a.in.secure_channel_type = sec_chan_type;
+	a.in.computer_name = machine_name;
+	a.in.negotiate_flags = &in_negotiate_flags;
+	a.out.negotiate_flags = &out_negotiate_flags;
+	a.in.credentials = &credentials3;
+	a.out.return_credentials = &credentials3;
+
+	creds = netlogon_creds_client_init(tctx, a.in.account_name,
+					   a.in.computer_name,
+					   a.in.secure_channel_type,
+					   &credentials1, &credentials2,
+					   mach_password, &credentials3,
+					   in_negotiate_flags);
+
+	torture_assert(tctx, creds != NULL, "memory allocation");
+
+	torture_comment(tctx, "Testing ServerAuthenticate2\n");
+
+	torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(
+		tctx,
+		dcerpc_netr_ServerAuthenticate2_r(b, tctx, &a),
+		"ServerAuthenticate2 failed");
+	torture_assert_ntstatus_equal(
+		tctx,
+		a.out.result,
+		NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED,
+		"ServerAuthenticate2 unexpected");
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool test_ServerReqChallenge_4_repeats(
+	struct torture_context *tctx,
+	struct dcerpc_pipe *p,
+	struct cli_credentials *credentials)
+{
+	struct netr_ServerReqChallenge r;
+	struct netr_Credential credentials1, credentials2, credentials3;
+	const char *machine_name;
+	struct dcerpc_binding_handle *b = p->binding_handle;
+	struct netr_ServerAuthenticate2 a;
+	uint32_t in_negotiate_flags = NETLOGON_NEG_AUTH2_ADS_FLAGS;
+	uint32_t out_negotiate_flags = 0;
+	const struct samr_Password *mach_password = NULL;
+	enum netr_SchannelType sec_chan_type = 0;
+	struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *creds = NULL;
+	const char *account_name = NULL;
+
+	machine_name = cli_credentials_get_workstation(credentials);
+	mach_password = cli_credentials_get_nt_hash(credentials, tctx);
+	account_name = cli_credentials_get_username(credentials);
+	sec_chan_type = cli_credentials_get_secure_channel_type(credentials);
+
+	torture_comment(tctx, "Testing ServerReqChallenge\n");
+
+	r.in.server_name = NULL;
+	r.in.computer_name = machine_name;
+	r.in.credentials = &credentials1;
+	r.out.return_credentials = &credentials2;
+
+        /*
+         * Set the first 4 bytes of the client challenge to the same
+         * value, this should pass as 5 bytes identical are needed to
+         * fail for CVE-2020-1472(ZeroLogon)
+         *
+	 * BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14497
+	 */
+	credentials1.data[0] = 'A';
+	credentials1.data[1] = 'A';
+	credentials1.data[2] = 'A';
+	credentials1.data[3] = 'A';
+	credentials1.data[4] = 'B';
+	credentials1.data[5] = 'C';
+	credentials1.data[6] = 'D';
+	credentials1.data[7] = 'E';
+
+	torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(
+		tctx,
+		dcerpc_netr_ServerReqChallenge_r(b, tctx, &r),
+		"ServerReqChallenge failed");
+	torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(
+		tctx,
+		r.out.result,
+		"ServerReqChallenge failed");
+	a.in.server_name = NULL;
+	a.in.account_name = account_name;
+	a.in.secure_channel_type = sec_chan_type;
+	a.in.computer_name = machine_name;
+	a.in.negotiate_flags = &in_negotiate_flags;
+	a.out.negotiate_flags = &out_negotiate_flags;
+	a.in.credentials = &credentials3;
+	a.out.return_credentials = &credentials3;
+
+	creds = netlogon_creds_client_init(tctx, a.in.account_name,
+					   a.in.computer_name,
+					   a.in.secure_channel_type,
+					   &credentials1, &credentials2,
+					   mach_password, &credentials3,
+					   in_negotiate_flags);
+
+	torture_assert(tctx, creds != NULL, "memory allocation");
+
+	torture_comment(tctx, "Testing ServerAuthenticate2\n");
+
+	torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(
+		tctx,
+		dcerpc_netr_ServerAuthenticate2_r(b, tctx, &a),
+		"ServerAuthenticate2 failed");
+	torture_assert_ntstatus_equal(
+		tctx,
+		a.out.result,
+		NT_STATUS_OK,
+		"ServerAuthenticate2 unexpected");
+
+	return true;
+}
+
 /*
   try a change password for our machine account
 */
@@ -4954,6 +5273,22 @@ struct torture_suite *torture_rpc_netlogon(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx)
 	torture_rpc_tcase_add_test(tcase, "lsa_over_netlogon", test_lsa_over_netlogon);
 	torture_rpc_tcase_add_test_creds(tcase, "SetupCredentialsDowngrade", test_SetupCredentialsDowngrade);
 
+	torture_rpc_tcase_add_test_creds(
+		tcase,
+		"ServerReqChallenge",
+		test_ServerReqChallenge);
+	torture_rpc_tcase_add_test_creds(
+		tcase,
+		"ServerReqChallenge_zero_challenge",
+		test_ServerReqChallenge_zero_challenge);
+	torture_rpc_tcase_add_test_creds(
+		tcase,
+		"ServerReqChallenge_5_repeats",
+		test_ServerReqChallenge_5_repeats);
+	torture_rpc_tcase_add_test_creds(
+		tcase,
+		"ServerReqChallenge_4_repeats",
+		test_ServerReqChallenge_4_repeats);
 	return suite;
 }
 
-- 
2.20.1